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INTRODUCTION
This appeal involves, literally, a four-letter dispute. In two instances,
"-or" mistakenly became "-ee," creating obvious typographical errors in an
unambiguous leasehold mortgage in which the term "mortgagee" was
inadvertently typed instead of "mortgagor."
Appellant Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC ("Wolf) and appeUee ASC Utah,
Inc. ("ASCU") are parties to a leasehold mortgage that was designed to secure
certain obligations of ASCU, as mortgagor and tenant, to Wolf, as mortgagee
and landlord, under a Ground Lease related to property used for the
operation of The Canyons ski resort. The property interest which ASCU
mortgaged is ASCU's "right, title and interest in an Amended and Restated
Lease Agreement Number 419, by and between the State of Utah, School and
Institutional Trust Lands Administration, as landlord, and Mortgagor
[ASCU], as tenant," referred to as the "Mortgaged Estate." Wolf and ASCU
intended to classify certain events as defaults under the leasehold mortgage,
but they also employed limited exceptions. Thus, under the "Due-on-Sale"
clause, it is an event of default for ASCU to sell, transfer, convey, or assign (i)
"all or any portion of, or any interest in, the Mortgaged Estate," or (ii) "any
controlling ownership interest in and to the Mortgagor [ASCU]." However,
the parties recognized two exceptions wherein such transfers would not be an
event of default. The "First Exception" exempts collateral assignment of the

Mortgaged Estate to a bona fide third party lender from being a default,
provided that the assignment specifically states that it is subject to certain
rights of Wolf as the Mortgagee. Similarly, under the "Second Exception" the
transfer is not a default if it was a "transfer of all or substantially all" of
ASCU's interests in The Canyons resort, including its interests as tenant
under the Ground Lease, provided that the transfer specifically states it is
subject to Wolfs rights as Mortgagee under the leasehold mortgage.
The "Second Exception" was ultimately reduced to writing as follows:
except for . . . (ii) any transfer of all or substantially all of
Mortgagee's rights in and to the development currently
known as The Canyons (including, without limitation, all of
Mortgagee's interest as tenant under the Ground Lease and
the Mortgaged Estate) whether effected by stock or asset
sale, provided that such transfer shall be expressly subject to
each and every one of the Hens, rights and interests of the
Mortgagee under this Leasehold Mortgage. For purposes of
the foregoing sentence, "substantially all" shall include all of
the assets held by Mortgagor which are necessary for
unimpeded operation and development of The Canyons
resort as it currently exists or may be improved.
Under well-settled principles of contract interpretation, the only reasonable
interpretation of this provision, when viewing the entire contract as a whole,
is to construe the first two references to " Mortgagee" as "Mortgagor." The
mortgage defines ASCU (Mortgagor), as the tenant—not Wolf. The mortgage
defines the Mortgaged Estate as ASCU's interest—not Wolfs. The
provision's purpose is to carve out an exception so that a sale of all of ASCU's

stock is not an event of default so long as the sale is expressly subject to
Wolfs rights as Mortgagee. It would make no sense to carve out an exception
for a sale of Wolfs interests so long as the sale was subject to Wolfs interests
as Mortgagee. Thus, the first two uses of the term "Mortgagee," as italicized
above, are obvious typographical errors. The interpretation of the Due-onSale-Clause's Second Exception that Wolf proffers in its brief renders the
exception an absurdity, is nonsensical, and ignores the purpose of the Dueon-Sale provision, as well as the plain language of other portions of this and
other provisions of the Leasehold Mortgage.
The district court closely analyzed the contract documents, and
determined that Wolfs disingenuous interpretation made no sense.
Accordingly, the district court granted ASCU's motion for summary
judgment, finding as a matter of law that a sale of ASCU's capital stock in
2007 did not violate the leasehold mortgage because the sale complied with
the "Second Exception."
Wolf insists that correcting the typographical mistake and conforming
to the parties' obvious intentions offends the principles of contract
interpretation. To the contrary, the district court's analysis and conclusion
were not in error; they complied fully with established Utah law regarding
contract interpretation. Accordingly, ASCU requests that the Court affirm

the district court's order, which denied Wolfs motion for summary judgment
and granted ASCU's cross-motion.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103.
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
Issue 1.

Did the trial court err in granting ASCU's cross-motion for
summary judgment based on a reading of the parties'
leasehold mortgage that considered the leasehold mortgage
as a whole and harmonized its various provisions?

Standard of Review. Appellate courts in Utah "review a district court's
grant [or denial] of summary judgment for correctness, affording no deference
to the district court." Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT
App 119, t 5, 208 P.3d 1077 (quoting Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App
25, 115, 156 P.3d 175). The question of whether a contract provision is
ambiguous, i.e., susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations, is a
question of law. Home Sav. and Loan v. Aetna Cas. And Sur. Co., 817 P.2d
341, 347 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted).
Issue 2.

Did the trial court err in excluding extrinsic evidence where
the court was presented with unambiguous contracts?

Standard of Review.

"Questions of contract interpretation which are

confined to the language of the contract itself are questions of law, which we
review for correctness." Mellor v. Wasatch Crest Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 UT 5, f
7, 201 P.3d 1004. "If a contract is deemed ambiguous, and the trial court

allows extrinsic evidence of intent, interpretation of the contract becomes a
factual matter and our review is strictly limited.' " Radman v. Flanders
Corp., 2007 UT App 351, 1 5, 172 P.3d 668 (quoting Nielsen v. Gold's Gym,
2003 UT 37, t 6, 78 P.3d 600).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. ('Wolf) commenced this action against
ASC Utah, Inc. ("ASCU") and a number other defendants 1 in September 2007
seeking, among other things, to foreclose a leasehold mortgage under which
ASCU was the mortgagor and Wolf the mortgagee. (R. 1-9). Wolf alleged that
the sale of all of ASCU's stock to Talisker Canyons Finance Co., LLC
("Talisker Canyons") was an "event of default" that permitted Wolf to
foreclose and recoup damages.
Following discovery, Wolf moved for partial summary judgment under
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 seeking a declaration that ASCU had defaulted under the
parties' Leasehold Mortgage. (R. 187-191). ASCU cross-moved, on the
grounds that the only reasonable interpretation of the contract documents
was to provide an exception to the due-on-sale clause for transfers of ASCU's
assets that were expressly subject to Wolfs rights as mortgagee; and because
the transfer of ASCU's capital stock to Talisker was subject to Wolfs
1

Wolf also sued General Electric Capital Company, Enoch Richard Smith, the
estate of Enoch Smith, Jr., Gulp Construction Company, Richard Brande Drywall,
Inc., Designteam Inc., and STF Electrical Services, Inc. Its claims against these
defendants were dismissed.

mortgagee rights, it fell within this exception and was not, as a matter of law,
an event of default under the leasehold mortgage.
In a ruling and order dated March 26, 2010, the court below granted
ASCU's motion and denied Wolfs motion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
ASCU operates The Canyons ski resort in Summit County, Utah. (R. 3).
In 1997, ASCU, as tenant, entered into a Ground Lease 2 with Wolf, as
landlord, for certain property in Summit County, including some of the land
upon which The Canyons operates. Pursuant to the Ground Lease, ASCU
agreed to pay Wolf, as annual rent payments, 4% of ASCU's gross sales and
lodging revenues at The Canyons and 11% of certain construction and
development costs, as well as certain one-time payments based on paid skier
visits to The Canyons as additional rent. (Ground Lease at § 3.01).
Several tracts of land are covered by the Ground Lease; one such tract
("Section 2") was leased by Wolf from the State of Utah through its School
and Institutional Trust Lands Administration pursuant to the "SITLA
Lease." (R. 3). In 1998, With Wolfs consent, ASCU renegotiated and became
the direct tenant under the SITLA Lease pursuant to an Amended and
2

Hereinafter, the "Ground Lease," a true and correct copy of which is attached as
Exhibit 1 to Wolfs February 9, 2010 Combined Reply Memorandum in Support of
Wolf Mountain's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant ASC Utah, Inc.'s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment ("Wolf Combined Reply") (R. 216-260).

Restated Lease Agreement No. 419 (the "Amended and Restated Lease"). 3
The resort's master plan provides for residential development on the Section
2 parcel; this development is referred to as the Red Pine Village. (R. 3).
The Ground Lease authorizes ASCU to transfer its interests under the
Ground Lease, including by sale of all or substantially all of ASCU's voting
stock or assets, under certain limited conditions. Specifically, § 10.02 of the
Ground Lease states:
Assignment. [ASCU] shall not assign all or any portion of
the Lease without obtaining the prior written consent of
[Wolf] to any such assignment, which consent [Wolf] may
not unreasonably withhold or delay. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, Tenant shall not be prohibited from assigning all
or any portion of its interest hereunder to any entity
affiliated with [ASCU]. Except as provided below, [ASCU]
and Holdings shall remain fully liable to perform their
respective obligations under this Lease and the related
Guaranty, notwithstanding any assignment permitted
hereunder.
A sale of all or substantially all [ASCU's] assets, or a
transfer of record or beneficial ownership of more than 50%
of the voting stock of [ASCU] to a party unaffiliated with
[ASCU], whether by merger, consolidation, or other
reorganization, shall constitute an "assignment" for
purposes of this Section 10.02. In such event, [Wolf] may
not unreasonably withhold or delay its consent provided
that the proposed successor of [ASCU] shall be a person or
business organization with financial condition and
operating capability and expense reasonably adequate to
3

A true and correct copy is attached as Exhibit B to Defendant ASC Utah, Inc. 's
Combined Memorandum: In Opposition to Wolf Mountain's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and in Support of ASC Utah, Inc/s Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment ("ASCU Combined Memo/') (R. 196-217).

operate the premises in a manner consistent with other
comparably sized ski resorts throughout the United States.
(Ground Lease at § 10.02).
In November 1999, ASCU and Wolf executed an amendment to the
Ground Lease (the "Second Amendment," Exhibit 2 to Wolf Combined Reply).
Among other things, the Second Amendment provides that if and when
ASCU receives all necessary approvals to commence construction of units at
Red Pine Village, ASCU shall grant to Wolf fee simple title to the land for 100
lodging units at that location. Under the Second Amendment, ASCU agreed
to secure its obligation by providing a mortgage to Wolf. Specifically, Section
12 of the Second Amendment states:
One Hundred Units. [ASCU] shall grant to [Wolf] fee
simple title to land, free and clear of all liens and
encumbrances, excepting the Village Management
Agreement and the Development Agreement, within Red
Pine Village (the "Red Pine Parcel") on which [ASCU] has
obtained approval from Summit County for one hundred
(100) Hotel/Lodging Units (as defined in the Development
Agreement) (the "100 Units") in Red Pine village,
contemporaneously with [ASCU's] receipt from Summit
County of all necessary approvals to commence
construction of its first phase of development of
Hotel/Lodging Units in Red Pine Village. To secure [Wolfs]
interest, [ASCU] shall execute and deliver to [Wolf] a
leasehold mortgage . . . of [ASCU's] option to purchase that
portion of the State of Utah School and Institutional Trust
Lands Administration lands required to satisfy [ASCU's]
obligation hereunder. The leasehold mortgage shall not in
any way limit or reduce [ASCU's] obligation to deliver the
Red Pine Parcel to [Wolf] as required hereunder. There
shall be no time restriction on the delivery of the 100 Units

other than the requirement that delivery be
contemporaneous with the approval, if any, of [ASCU's]
first phase of Hotel/Lodging Unit development in Red Pine
Village. [Wolf] and [ASCU] shall cooperatively determine
the planning, design, and configuration of the 100 Units,
provided that such planning and design shall be in all
respects consistent with the planning, design, and
architectural guidelines for Red Pine Village. The 100
Units shall be an average representative of the entire mix
of Hotel/Lodging Units in Red Pine Village, with an
average size of 1500 square feet, subject to Summit County
approval. [ASCU] shall, at its expense, deliver the final
recorded plat for the 100 Units, including all planning,
engineering, design, and architecture associated therewith.
[ASCU] shall at its sole cost and expense stub roads and all
utilities to the boundaries of the lots on which the 100
Units are located. [ASCU] shall at its own cost provide
[Wolf] with water rights and entitlement to water delivery
for the entire project including the 100 Units. . . .
(Second Amendment at ^ff 5-6).
On or about November 23, 2005, ASCU and Wolf executed a "Leasehold
Mortgage" with Wolf as mortgagee and ASCU as mortgagor. 4 The
Leasehold Mortgage defines a limited number of events as defaults. Among
them, according to the "Due-on-Sale" clause:
Any of the following shall be an event of default ("Event of
Default"):
(iv) any sale, transfer, conveyance or assignment of any or
all portion of, or any interest in, the Mortgaged Estate, or
the sale, transfer, conveyance or assignment of any
controlling ownership interest in and to the Mortgagor

4

A true and correct copy of the Leasehold Mortgage is attached as Exhibit B to the
Brief of Appellant (hereinafter, "Wolf Brief).

(which shall not include transfer of controlling ownership
interest in the Mortgagor's parent or shareholders). . . .
(Leasehold Mortgage at § 4.A(iv)). There are two exceptions, however, to the
Due-on-Sale clause. The "First Exception" exempts collateral assignment of
the Mortgaged Estate to a bona fide third party lender from being a default,
provided that the assignment specifically states that it is subject to certain
rights of Wolf as the Mortgagee. Similarly, the "Second Exception" states:
except for . . . (ii) any transfer of all or substantially all of
Mortgagee's rights in and to the development currently
known as The Canyons (including, without limitation, all of
Mortgagee's interest as tenant under the Ground
Lease and the Mortgaged Estate) whether effected by stock
or asset sale, provided that such transfer shall be
expressly subject to each and every one of the liens,
rights and interests of the Mortgagee under this
Leasehold Mortgage. For purposes of the foregoing
sentence, "substantially all" shall include all of the
assets held by Mortgagor which are necessary for
unimpeded operation and development of The Canyons
resort as it currently exists or may be improved. The terms
of this Paragraph A. shall be strictly construed, and if any
collateral assignment hereunder does not include the
specific language of agreement and acknowledgment in
favor of Mortgagee as required by this paragraph, such
collateral assignment shall be null and void.
(Leasehold Mortgage at § 4.A(iv)) (emphasis added).
On July 15, 2007, ASCU and ASCU's then parent company, American
Skiing Company ("ASC"), entered into an agreement with Talisker Canyons
and Talisker Corp. (together, "Talisker") for ASC to transfer all of the
outstanding capital stock of ASCU to Talisker. (R. 7, 26). The Talisker

Purchase Agreement clearly and unambiguously binds Talisker Canyons to
each and every one of the liens, rights and interests of Wolf under the
Leasehold Mortgage: "the transfer of title to Buyer is subject to each and
every one of the liens, rights and interests of Wolf under the Leasehold
Mortgage and each and every one of the liens, rights and interests of Wolf
under the Leasehold Mortgage shall survive Closing." (R. 196).
Alleging that the sale of ASCU stock was a default under the Leasehold
Mortgage, Wolf commenced the underlying action in September 2007, seeking
a judicial decree of foreclosure that would permit Wolf to become sole tenant
under the SITLA Lease, as well as expenses and costs under the Leasehold
Mortgage. (R. 1-11).
The parties conducted fact discovery and in December 2009, Wolf
moved for partial summary judgment, urging the district court to hold ASCU
in default under the Due-on-Sale Clause. (R. 187-191). In support of its
motion, Wolf submitted an affidavit of its counsel, Bradley E. Rauch dated
February 5, 2009.5 Among other things, the Rauch Affidavit purported to
describe the parties' negotiations, the exchange of Leasehold Mortgage drafts,
and the parties' intentions. Through the Rauch Affidavit, Wolf alleged for the
first time that the Second Exception "was intended to provide Wolf

5

Hereinafter, the "Rauch Affidavit," a true and correct copy of which is
attached as Exhibit 5 to the Wolf Combined Reply.

Mountain—the "Mortgagee"—with the right to enter into a joint transaction
with ASCU to sell both of their interests in the resorts and its underlying
lands to a third party without triggering the Due-on-Sale Clause." Rauch
Affidavit at ^ 23. ASCU opposed Wolfs motion and cross-moved for partial
summary judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 56. ASCU explained that the
extrinsic evidence confirmed ASCU's reading: that the Second Exception
carves out an exception to default under the Due-on-Sale provision and,
therefore, the transfer of ASCU's capital stock to TaHsker Canyons—which
met the terms of the Second Exception—was not an event of default under
the Leasehold Mortgage.
The district court issued a Ruling and Order on March 26, 2010
denying Wolfs motion and granting ASCU's cross-motion. The district court
observed that
[t]he negotiated terms are not precisely reflected in the
final Leasehold Mortgage. Read literally, it would allow the
Mortgagee (Wolf) to transfer its rights. It is clear that the
intent was for the interests of ASCU to be transferred
subject to Wolfs interests, not the other way around.

The literal language [of the Second Exception] is
nonsensical as the word Mortgagee in the first two phrases
of 4A(ii) is an error and the only reasonable construction is
that the [S]econd [E]xception applies to the transfer of
ASCU's rights, not the transfer of Wolf s interests. The
court is to avoid an unreasonable interpretation. If
the sale of ASCU's stock is an event of default

creating an exception to the sale of Wolf s stock
(there is no Wolf stock) [the Second Exception]
makes no sense
It makes even less sense to say
Wolfs transfer of rights is subject to Wolfs rights. But
making an exception for ASCU does make sense.
The Talisker sale specifically indicates that now
Talisker is subject to the liens, rights and interests of Wolf
under the mortgage, further evidencing that such an
interpretation makes sense.
(R. 299-321) (emphasis in original). The district court carefully set forth the
reasons for its decision:
1.

The contract as a whole "leaves NO DOUBT, on its
face, apart from the 'mortgagee' - 'mortgagor' conflict,
what was intended. This was intended to secure Wolf
against defaults by ASCU, and to protect ASCU from
a foreclosure unless it made a transfer that did not
protect Wolfs rights and interests." (Ruling and
Order at 13).

2.

"Wolf transferring its assets, and as a limited liability
it owns no stock of course) cannot be a default under
such a Leasehold Mortgage. A Due on sale clause, of
course, is designed to protect the interests of the
mortgagee (Wolf) by giving the mortgagee a remedy if
the mortgagor transfers its interests. Thus, the
entire purpose of the entire document on its face is
clear." (Ruling and Order at 14).

3.

"Further, the remedies section of the Leasehold
Mortgage provides relief for Wolf as mortgagee. If
read as Wolf argues, the remedies section would
allow Wolf to default in some fashion, then foreclose
the mortgage as the defaulting party or accelerate
the benefits due to Wolf from ASCU under the
mortgage. That is an absurdity and grants Wolf the
right to absolutely and arbitrarily terminate the
contract. See Peirce v. Peirce. That is a construction

that is to be avoided under Utah law." (Ruling and
Order at 14).
4.

"Wolf has no interest in the Mortgaged Estate as that
term is defined in the Leasehold Mortgage.
'Mortgaged Estate' means ASCU's interest in the
SITLA lease." (RuHng and Order at 15).

5.

"Wolfs reading ... ignores parts of the second
exception. It defines 'substantially all' as being
substantially all of the assets of ASCU, not
Wolf...Thus, it is clear from the entire exception that
the assets are defined as belonging to mortgagor,
ASCU." (RuHng and Order at 16).

6.

"Wolf is not the tenant under the Ground Lease but
ASCU is the tenant under the Ground Lease. Given
that provision alone, the court can discern the intent
of the parties that ASCU, as mortgagor, may transfer
its assets without being in default but only if Wolf s
rights are preserved." (RuHng and Order at 16).

7.

"The court, as noted, FROM THE DOCUMENT
ITSELF, because as a legal matter there is no facial
ambiguity, makes the determinations it has made.
The court has not relied on the extrinsic evidence but
on the language in the document and the nature of
the agreement and its purposes." (RuHng and Order
at 20).

Thus, the court below properly interpreted the Leasehold Mortgage in
accordance with Utah law and granted ASCU's cross-motion.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court should affirm the district court's March 26, 2010 RuHng and
Order in its entirety. As the district court carefully explained in its 22-page
order, the only reasonable interpretation of the Second Exception to the Due-

on-Sale-Clause, as determined from the face of the document as a whole, is
that the provision intended that ASCU be in default upon sale but not if
Wolfs interests and rights were protected. Thus, with the obvious
typographical errors corrected to reflect the parties' actual intentions, Wolfs
foreclosure complaint fails to state a claim.
The district court determined that "based on the face of the document,"
the Leasehold Mortgage is unambiguous. (R. 310). Accordingly, it properly
excluded the parties' extrinsic evidence. The district court carefully assessed
whether and the extent to which each party's interpretation of the Second
Exception accords with Utah law governing contract interpretation.
The district court properly determined, and careful analysis of the Dueon-Sale Clause and Second Exception makes clear, that the parties must
have intended the first two instances of "Mortgagee's," (i.e. Wolfs), in the
Second Exception to be "Mortgagor's," (i.e. ASCU's). Conversely, Wolfs
literal reading of the obvious typographical errors yields the kind of
untenable results Utah courts endeavor to avoid. The district court's decision
is supported for the following reasons:
• The parties must have intended to use the word "Mortgagor"
because the plain language of the contract documents
demonstrates that ASCU—and not Wolf—is the Tenant under
the Ground Lease and Mortgaged Estate.

• Wolfs reading ignores language in the Due-on-Sale clause and
Second Exception and leads to a nonsensical result. First,
conditioning Wolfs transfer of its own interests on compliance
with Wolfs rights and interest under the Leasehold Mortgage is
absurd. Second, Wolfs reading creates an irreconcilable
inconsistency within the Second Exception. The Second
Exception states that a transfer of "substantially all" of
"Mortgagee's" assets shall constitute an event of default, but goes
on to state: "'substantially all' shall include all of the assets held
by Mortgagor FASCU1 which are necessary for unimpeded
operation and development of The Canyons resort as it currently
exists or may be improved." (Id.)
• Wolfs interpretation is inconsistent with the purpose of the Due
On Sale Clause and related Exceptions. Wolfs reading subverts
the meaning of the due-on-sale clause, which is intended to
protect Wolf as mortgagee against unauthorized sales or
transfers by ASCU as mortgagor and would allow Wolf to
construct a default by transferring its own interests.
• The sale of ASCU's stock did not violate or constitute a default
under the Leasehold Mortgage because it complied with the
Second Exception, as it was intended to read.

• The district court reached its result on the basis of contract
language alone, and correctly excluded extrinsic evidence.
Consequently, ASCU respectfully requests this Court to fully affirm the
district's rulings.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY
INTERPRETED THE CONTRACT AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
A.

The Plain Language and Purpose of the Contract as a Whole
Demonstrate that the District Court's Interpretation is the Only
Reasonable Interpretation as a Matter of Law.
1.

Contract Interpretation

The matter of interpreting a contract is a legal question. See Oakwood
Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, H 8-9, 104 P.3d 1226. The
court must look at the plain language of the contract to ascertain the parties'
intent. Envirocare of Utah v. Utah State Tax Com'n., 2009 UT 1, f 3, 201
P.3d 982. Utah law is clear that "[t]he primary rule in interpreting a contract
is to determine what the parties intended by looking at the entire contract
and all of its parts in relation to each other, giving an objective and
reasonable construction to the contract as a whole." Sears v. Riemersma, 655
P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982). "Where questions arise in the interpretation of
an agreement, the first source of inquiry is within the document itself. It
should be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with its purpose. All of

its parts should be given effect insofar as that is possible." Big Cottonwood
Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah App. 1987)
(citing Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Products Co., 614 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah 1980)).
So long as the language within the four corners is unambiguous, courts
"look no further than the plain meaning of the contractual language." MidAmerican Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four Inc., 2009 UT 43, | 19, 216 P.3d 352; see
also Daines v.Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 137, 190 P.3d 1259 f[W]e do not need to
resort to the admission of parol evidence on the question of intent, because
absent a finding of facial ambiguity, 'the parties' intentions must be
determined solely from the language of the contract."')
In addition, contracts must be construed in a manner that harmonizes
their various provisions and avoids an absurd result. See Olympus Hills
Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 458
(Utah App. 1994) (stating courts should avoid unreasonable interpretations
when a contract provision would reduce the contract to absurdity.) (citing
Barnhart v. McKinney, 682 P.2d 112, 120 (Kan. 1984)). Thus, "a construction
which contradicts the general purpose of the contract or results in a hardship
or absurdity is presumed to be unintended by the parties." LDS Hosp., Div.
of Intermountain Health Care v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 859
(Utah 1988) (citing Campbell v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 209 P.3d 859, 862 (Wash.
Sup. Ct. 2009); see also Burt v. String fellow, 143 P. 234 (1914) ("In arriving at

a conclusion [as to the meaning of a contract] all the words and expressions
used by the parties in the contract must be given full force and effect, unless
to do so leads to an absurdity or is contrary to the manifest purpose and
intention of the parties.")
The standard is similar vis-a-vis contractual ambiguity. When
determining whether the plain language of a contract is ambiguous, courts
"attempt to harmonize all of the contract's provisions and all of its terms."'
Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, f 12, 40 P.3d 599.
Although the district court concluded, and the parties do not dispute, that the
Leasehold Mortgage is unambiguous, ASCU and Wolf nonetheless offer
competing constructions of the Due-On-Sale Clause and Second Exception.
However, a provision is not necessarily ambiguous "simply because one party
seeks to endow [it] with a different meaning than that relied upon by the
drafter." Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).
A court will find ambiguity in contract language "only if it is reasonably
susceptible to more than one interpretation." Mid-America Pipeline Co., 2009
UT 43, If 19, 216 P.3d 352. The different interpretations must be "competing"
and "contrary;" if the parties argue for interpretations that are essentially
the same, there is no ambiguity. Daines, 2008 UT 51 at f t 29, 31. Moreover,
a party cannot successfully claim an ambiguity if its proposed interpretation
is the product of forced or strained construction. Id. at f 30 n.5.

2.

The District Court Interpreted the Leasehold Mortgage in
the Only Way that Harmonizes its Provisions and
Effectuates their Purpose.

The district court recognized that strictly as written, the Leasehold
Mortgage led to an absurdity. If the sale of Wolf s interests was intended to
be an event of default under the Due-on-Sale clause, the Leasehold Mortgage
cannot be construed as a coherent whole. On the other hand, if the first two
"Mortgagee5"s" in the Second Exception were corrected to "Mortgagor's/' the
whole of the Leasehold Mortgage can be reasonably and objectively
constructed. Accordingly, it was not error to grant summary judgment in
ASCU's favor.
The purpose of a due-on-sale clause is to protect a mortgagee's interests
by conditioning the mortgagor's ability to sell or otherwise transfer the real
estate subject to the mortgage. Thus, Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed., defines
"due-on-sale clause" as "a mortgage provision giving the lender the option to
accelerate the debt if the borrower transfers or conveys any part of the
mortgaged real estate without the lender's consent." Black's makes no
mention of a due-on-sale clause protecting the interests of the borrowermortgagor—because that would make no sense.
ASCU and Wolf intended the Leasehold Mortgage to secure ASCU's
obligation, under the Second Amendment to the Ground Lease, to grant Wolf
fee simple title to lodging units in ASCU's Red Pine Village. The Due-on Sale

clause in the Leasehold Mortgage was designed to protect Wolf as mortgagee.
Thus, it states that
any sale, transfer, conveyance or assignment of all or any portion
of, or any interest in, the Mortgaged Estate [the land subject to
the SITLA Lease], or the sale, transfer, conveyance or
assignment of any controlling interest in and to the Mortgagor
[ASCII]
shall be an event of default. (Leasehold Mortgage at § 4.A(iv)(ii)). The plain
language demonstrates that the Due-on-Sale clause is intended to protect
Wolf, the mortgagee, where (1) ASCII sells or otherwise transfers its interest
in the land subject to the SITLA lease or (2) a controlling interest in ASCII is
sold or otherwise transferred to a third party.
The First and Second Exceptions modify the Due-on Sale clause by
carving out certain kinds of sales or transfers, so long as the transfers protect
the rights of Wolf as mortgagee. After insertion of party names to the Second
Exception as written, it states:
(ii) any transfer of all or substantially all of Mortgagee's
[Wolfs] rights in and to the development currently known
as The Canyons (including, without limitation, all of
Mortgagee's [Wolfs] interest as tenant under the Ground
Lease and the Mortgaged Estate) whether effected by stock
or asset sale, provided that such transfer shall be expressly
subject to each and every one of the liens, rights and
interests of Mortgagee [Wolf] under the Leasehold
Mortgage. For purposes of the foregoing sentence,
"substantially all" shall include all of the assets held by
Mortgagor [ASCII] which are necessary for unimpeded
operation and development of The Canyons resort as it
currently exists or may be improved.

(Leasehold Mortgage at § 4.A(iv)(ii)). Read literally, the Second Exception
would mean that a transfer of all or substantially all of Wolf s rights in The
Canyons (including under the Ground Lease and SITLA Lease) would not
give rise to a default under the Leasehold Mortgage as long as the transfer
was subject to each of Wolf s "liens, rights, and interests" under the
Leasehold Mortgage. This makes no sense. The first two iterations of the
word "Mortgagee's" therefore, necessarily must reflect a typographical or
scrivener's error; that the word "Mortgagor" was intended by the parties can
be gleaned when the Leasehold Mortgage is read as a whole.
a.

Under the Agreements' Plain Language, Wolf Is Not
the Tenant Under the Ground Lease Nor the
Mortgaged Estate.

The Second Exception under the Leasehold Mortgage concerns a
transfer of the tenant's interest under the Ground Lease. The Leasehold
Mortgage expressly defines ASCU as Tenant on more than one occasion:
This Mortgage is given solely for the purpose of securing Mortgagor's
obligation set forth in Article 12 of the Second Amendment to Ground
Lease Agreement ("Second Amendment"), dated November 12, 1999, by
and between Mortgagor, as tenant, and Mortgagee, as landlord ....
Leasehold Mortgage at f 2 (emphasis added).
...that certain Ground Lease Agreement dated as of July 3, 1997,
between Mortgagee, as landlord, and Mortgagor, as tenant, as
amended ("Ground Lease")
Leasehold Mortgage at ^|4(A)(iii)(a) (emphasis added).

Further, the Ground Lease could not be clearer. It plainly states that it

made and entered into by and between Wolf Mountain Resorts,
L.C., a limited liability company organized under the law of the
State of Utah with a principal place of business in Summit
County, Utah ("Landlord"), and ASC Utah, Inc., a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Maine with
its principal place of business at Bethel, Maine ("Tenant")
(Ground Lease at 1).
As the district court correctly held:
Wolf is not the tenant under the Ground Lease but ASCU is the
tenant under the Ground Lease. Given that provision alone, the
court can discern the intent of the parties that ASCU, as
mortgagor, may transfer its assets without being in default but
only if Wolf s rights are preserved.
(Ruling and Order at 16).
Although Wolf takes issue with the district court's interpretation, the
plain, unambiguous language of both the Leasehold Mortgage and the
Ground Lease demonstrate that ASCU is the tenant. The district court was
thus correct in reviewing and analyzing the plain language of the Leasehold
Mortgage as it did, without resort to extrinsic evidence. Mid-American
Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four Inc., 2009 UT 43, 1 19, 216 P.3d 352; see also
Daines v.Vincent, , 2008 UT 51, 1 37, 190 P.3d 1259.
Moreover, the district court's analysis was correct in determining that
the plain language of the Leasehold Mortgage demonstrated that Wolf has no
"interest in the Mortgaged Estate," and thus could not trigger the Due-on-

Sale clause by transferring it. The Leasehold Mortgage defines "Mortgaged
Estate" as "all of Mortgagor's [ASCU's] right, title and interest in and to" the
SITLA Lease. (Leasehold Mortgage at § 1). Additionally, the Amended and
Restated SITLA Lease also clearly defines ASCU as "Lessee." or tenant, and
not Wolf. SITLA Lease No. 419 at 1, attached as Exhibit B to Brief of
Appellant. Thus, pursuant to the plain, unambiguous language, the Second
Exception's reference to "Mortgagee's interest as tenant under the Ground
Lease and the Mortgaged Estate" necessarily must refer to ASCU's interests.
The district court should, therefore, be affirmed.
b.

Wolfs Tortured Interpretation Ignores Material Parts
of the Second Exception and Creates a Nonsensical
Result.

The terms "Mortgagor" and "Mortgagee" later in the Second Exception
confirm that the first two iterations of "Mortgagee's" were erroneous and
unintended. When interpreting contract language, Utah courts must "look[ ]
at the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other, giving an
objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole." Sears v.
Riemersma, 65 P.2d at 1108. Wolfs tortured reading of the Second Exception
robs the Second Exception of an "objective and reasonable construction," to
say nothing of the Leasehold Mortgage as a whole.
Read with the scrivener's error, the Second Exception would allow Wolf
to transfer its interest in The Canyons so long as the transfer is subject to the

"liens, rights and interests" of Wolf under the Leasehold Mortgage.
Conditioning Wolfs transfer of its own interests on compliance with Wolfs
rights and interest under the Leasehold Mortgage is absurd. However,
creating an exception to default for the transfer of ASCU's interest in The
Canyons provided that the transfer is subject to the rights and interests of
Wolf under the Leasehold Mortgage makes sense and is reasonable, as the
district court acknowledged. (R. 134, "subjecting a transfer of Wolf s rights in
and to the development currently known as The Canyons to Wolfs liens,
rights and interests under the Leasehold Mortgage, is not logical and is
somewhat nonsensical.")
Moreover, Wolfs reading creates an irreconcilable inconsistency within
the Second Exception. The Second Exception states that a transfer of
"substantially all" of "Mortgagee's" assets shall constitute an event of default,
but goes on to state: "'substantially all' shall include all of the assets held by
Mortgagor TASCUI which are necessary for unimpeded operation and
development of The Canyons resort as it currently exists or may be
improved." (Id.) (emphasis added). If the second sentence is properly drafted,
which neither party disputes, it confirms that the reference in the first
sentence to "Mortgagee's" was necessarily a scrivener's error.
Contracts must be construed in a manner that harmonizes their
various provisions and avoids an absurd result. See Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d

at 458 (stating courts should avoid unreasonable interpretations when a
contract provision would reduce the contract to absurdity) (citing Barnhart v.
McKinney, 682 P.2d 112, 120 (Kan. 1984)); see also Burt, 143 P. at 236 ("In
arriving at a conclusion [as to the meaning of a contract] all the words and
expressions used by the parties in the contract must be given full force and
effect, unless to do so leads to an absurdity or is contrary to the manifest
purpose and intention of the parties/') Wolfs interpretation is unreasonable
because it would create an absurdity, by requiring Wolf to place a condition
on itself to not transfer its interests without protecting them and by creating
an irreconcilable inconsistency within the Second Exception with respect to
the phrase "substantially all of ASCII's assets."
c.

Wolfs Interpretation is Inconsistent With the Purpose
of the Due On Sale Clause and Exceptions.

There are multiple other problems with Wolfs literal interpretation of
the Due-on-Sale clause in conjunction with the Second Exception.
Under Wolfs indefensible reading of the Due-on-Sale clause, default
would be triggered by the sale of either any interest in the Mortgaged Estate
or a controlling interest in ASCU, unless such involves a transfer oiall of
Wolf Mountain's rights in The Canyons. (Wolf Brief at 33). But Wolfs
contorted analysis in its Brief ignores the first part of the clause ("any sale,
transfer, conveyance or assignment of all or any portion of, or any interest in,

the Mortgaged Estate"), insisting that only the second part of the clause is
implicated here. (See Wolf Brief at 33, "the only trigger at issue in this case is
the sale of ASCU"). Wolf maintains that it has an interest in the Mortgaged
Estate. (Wolf Brief at 30, "it cannot seriously be argued that Wolf Mountain
'has no interest in the Mortgaged Estate.'") Therefore, the reading proffered
by Wolf of the Due-on-Sale clause and the Second Exception permit Wolf to
trigger a default by transferring less than "all or substantially all" of its
rights "in and to" The Canyons. Wolfs reading would thus allow Wolf to
trigger a default of the Leasehold Mortgage and then, as the defaulting party,
foreclose and/or accelerate the benefits due from ASCU. Wolf dismisses such
a scenario as "speculative" and "hypothetical," (Wolf Brief at 33), but it is
plainly the consequence of Wolf s interpretation of the Second Exception.
More importantly, Wolfs reading would subvert the purpose of due-onsale clauses and render a portion of the Second Exception extraneous. If read
literally, the Second Exception would carve out an exception to default for a
transfer of Wolf s interest in The Canyons—which makes no sense. Under
that interpretation, Wolf would be agreeing to not hold itself in default. But
under the correct, intended meaning of the Second Exception, a sale or
transfer of Wolf s interest would not run afoul of the Due-on-Sale clause. This
is because, as set forth above, the purpose of a due-on-sale clause is to protect
a mortgagee—here, Wolf—by limiting the ability of a mortgagor—ASCU—to

sell or transfer the mortgaged property. Accordingly, under a proper reading
of the Due-on-Sale clause, two situations could give rise to a default: (1) "any
sale, transfer or assignment of all or any portion of, or any interest in, the
Mortgaged Estate," i.e., ASCU's interest in the SITLA Lease, and (2) "the
sale, transfer, conveyance or assignment of any controlling ownership
interest in and to the Mortgagor [ASCU]. . .." (Leasehold Mortgage at §
4(A)(iv)). Nothing in the Leasehold Mortgage, as properly constructed,
provides that a transfer of Wolf s interest triggers the Due-on-Sale clause or
otherwise constitutes a default. Thus, Wolfs tortured readings of the Due-onSale clause and Second Exception cannot be rationalized.
The remedy sections of the Leasehold Mortgage also sustain the district
court's and ASCU's reading of the Due-on-Sale clause. Section 4.B of the
Leasehold Mortgage states that in the event of a default, Wolf may foreclose
the mortgage and shall have the immediate right to receive and collect rent,
income and profits from the Mortgaged Estate. There are no remedy
provisions in ASCU's favor.
Further, the phrase "whether effected by stock or asset sale" in the first
sentence of the Second Exception is also telling. As the district court
observed, "Wolf as a limited liability Wolf has no stock, but ASCU as a
corporation does have stock." (R.313). Thus, as applied to a sale or transfer of
Wolfs interests, the stock language has no meaning, but as applied to a sale

or transfer of the interests of ASCU, the added language makes complete
sense, particularly given ASCU's right under Section 10.02 of the Ground
Lease to assign its interests in the Ground Lease by stock or asset sale.
The district court correctly rejected Wolfs interpretation because it is
unreasonable and reduces the provision to an absurdity. See, e.g., Olympus
Hills, 889 P.2d at 458.
d.

ASCU's Stock Sale Was not a Default Because it
Complied with the Second Exception as the Parties
Intended it to Read.

Because the district court determined that the parties intended that a
sale of ASCU's assets or stock is not an event of default so long as Wolfs
rights under the mortgage are protected, it properly entered summary
judgment in ASCU's favor.
First, the Talisker Sale Agreement provides for the transfer of 100% of
ASCU's outstanding capital stock from ASC to Talisker. (Talisker Sale
Agreement at §§ 2.1, 3.2). Necessarily, the transaction "transfers] . . . all. . .
of [ASCU's] rights in and to the development currently known as The
Canyons." (Leasehold Mortgage at § 4.A). Second, the Talisker Sale
Agreement clearly and unambiguously binds Talisker to each and every one
of the liens, rights, and interests of Wolf under the Leasehold Mortgage. It
states:

9.16. Leasehold Mortgage. The Buyers acknowledge that
pursuant to that certain Leasehold Mortgage by and
between [ASCII], as mortgagor, and Wolf, as mortgagee,
dated as of November 23, 2005 (the "Leasehold Mortgage"),
the transfer of title to Buyer is subject to each and every
one of the liens, rights and interests of Wolf under the
Leasehold Mortgage and each and every one of the liens,
rights and interests of Wolf under the Leasehold Mortgage
shall survive Closing.
(Talisker Sale Agreement at § 9.16).
Because the Talisker Sale Agreement expressly meets the
requirements of the Second Exception, ASC's transfer of all of ASCU's
outstanding capital stock to Talisker Canyons does not constitute a default
under the Leasehold Mortgage. Accordingly, Wolfs foreclosure complaint
fails as an undisputed matter of fact and law, and summary judgment was
properly granted in ASCU's favor.
B.

Reformation Analysis is Inapposite

Wolf insists that the court below erred because it reformed the
Leasehold Mortgage despite the fact that ASCU never alleged or satisfied the
legal prerequisites for reformation based on mutual mistake. (Wolf Brief at
18-35). The district court did not "reform" the Leasehold Mortgage in
contravention to Utah law, it simply applied the rules of contract
interpretation. It did, however, avoid the absurd, untenable results that
Wolfs literal reading would have produced.

Utah courts are charged with interpreting contracting parties' intent as
expressed by the language of their agreement. See e.g., Glenn v. Reese, 2009
UT 80; Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, f 25, 207
P.3d 1235 (2009). Thus, as the district court properly stated, "[t]he court is to
avoid an unreasonable interpretation." (R. 303). See also Olympus Hills, 889
P.2d at 458 (stating courts should avoid unreasonable interpretations when a
provisions would reduce the contract to absurdity); LDS Hosp., Div. of
Intermountain Health, 765 P.2d at 859 ("a construction which contradicts the
general purpose of the contract or results in a hardship or absurdity is
presumed to be unintended by the parties.")
In particular, it is well-established that where a typographical or
clerical error makes a particular term or phrase inconsistent with the whole
contract, courts are authorized to correct the error and arrive at a reasonable
construction. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 202 cmt. d.6 "A written
contract should be construed according to the obvious intention of the parties,
notwithstanding clerical errors or inadvertent omissions therein which can be
corrected by perusing the whole instrument." AmJur2d Contracts § 373; see
also Starr v. Union Pacific Railroad Corp., 75P.3d 266, 269 (Kan. App. 2003)
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Utah courts routinely look to Restatement (Second) § 202 when determining how to
harmonize disparate provisions of a contract. See, e.g., Johnson v. Morton Thiokol,
Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1003 n. 27 (Utah 1991); Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts, 768
P.2d 976, 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

(citing Brown v. Lang, 675 P.2d 842 (Kan. 1984) (typographical error in
contract does not necessarily render the contract ambiguous)); and Doe v.
Texas Ass'n of School Boards, Inc., 283 S.W.3d 451 (Tex. App. Fort Worth
2009) (noting that typographical mistakes must "yield to the well-established
doctrine that written contracts will be construed according to the intention of
the parties, notwithstanding errors and omissions, by perusing the entire
document" (quoting City of Galveston v. Galveston Mun. Police Ass'n, 57
S.W.3d 532, 539 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001)).
Not surprisingly, other courts have had the occasion to employ these
same tenets of contract interpretation in the context of a mix-up of "-ee" for "or" terms, similar to the issue presented with the instant leasehold mortgage.
For instance, in Roth v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 739 S.W.2d 598 (Mo.
App. 1987) the court interpreted a lease, determining that the contract was
not ambiguous even though it contained the word "lessor" where logically the
word "lessee" should have appeared in the options to renew provision. Id. at
600. Similar to the instant action, the lessor in Roth argued that the use of "or" term in place of the "-ee" term created an ambiguity requiring the
consideration of extrinsic evidence. The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's holding "that the word lessor' was a typographical error and should be
interpreted as lessee"' and held that the trial court would only resort to
extrinsic evidence if it had found an ambiguity. Id.

The Mississippi Supreme Court has similarly upheld a trial court's
interpretation of a lease in which the term "grantee" was used in a provision
which should have read "grantor." See Robinson v. Martel Enterprises, Inc.,
337 So.2d 698 (Miss. 1976). The Court applied the general rule that: "'[t]he
intention of the parties must be collected from the whole agreement, and
every word therein must be given effect, if possible, and be made to operate
according to the intention of the parties.'" Id. at 701 (citation omitted). In
construing the provision to read "grantor" instead of "grantee," the Court
found that: "No apparent purpose would be served if [grantee] gave notice to
himself of his intent to exercise the option. With the word 'grantee' in the
clause, it has no meaning or purpose, but when the word 'grantor' is
substituted, the clause becomes clear and its meaning readily ascertainable."
Id.
As in Roth and Robinson, the district court simply applied well-settled
rules of contract interpretation to reach the only reasonable interpretation of
the Due-on-Sale Clause, ascertaining the intention of the parties from the
entire agreement on its face. Thus, Wolfs lengthy exposition on the law of
contract reformation is misplaced. The district court did not purport to reform
the Leasehold Mortgage and explicitly stated as much:
The court does not believe it is indeed involved in a
reformation as that concept is normally meant. The court
finds and concludes, FROM THE ENTIRETY OF THE

CONTRACT ON ITS FACE, that such was intended and
the error of placing "ee" rather than "or" was the product of
confusion or a scrivener's error.
(R. 317) (emphasis in original). By finding that the parties erroneously
transposed "-ee" and "-or" in the first two instances of the Second Exception,
the district court recognized and corrected what the Utah Supreme Court in
Guardian State Bank v. F.C. Stangl III, 778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1989), called "a
mistake in recordation or memorialization of an agreement." It would have
been error to grant Wolfs Rule 56 motion by slavishly applying the obvious
typographical errors in the Second Exception. The district court's avoidance
of an "unreasonable interpretation" did not, therefore, run afoul of
reformation doctrine; rather, it comported with Utah law on contract
interpretation. 7
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Wolf spends considerable time arguing that ASCU waived an affirmative defense of mistake by not asserting it in
its answer, but this issue was never raised below and it is inappropriate for Wolf to rely upon such a theory on
appeal. See State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 22, 128 P.3d 1171 ("[U]nder ordinary circumstances, we will not
consider an issue brought for the first time on appeal...." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The trial court never
made any such finding of waiver, has not had the opportunity to address the potential applicability of Rule 15 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any facts giving rise to such a defense were not known until after ASCU responded
to Wolfs complaint. Moreover, as the Utah Supreme Court has recognized, "the policy of our rules of procedure is
to decide cases on the merits rather than pleading technicalities." Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d at 8. A
court may "reform a document if a mutual mistake is established, even if the issue of mutual mistake was not raised
and reformation was not demanded in the pleadings." Id. (citing Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287,
290 (Utah 1984)).

C.

The District Court Did Not Employ a "Lack of Clarity" Standard

Wolf claims that the district court erred by inventing and applying a
"lack of clarity" standard. (Wolf Brief at 16-18). Wolf is mistaken, and "[t]he
characterization of error [ ] does not affect the right to a remedy." Guardian
State Bank v. F.C. Stangl III 778 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1989).
Wolfs mischaracterization, based on one passing reference, does not
change the fact that the district court carefully applied the proper contract
interpretation rules to the parties' cross-motions under Rule 56. (R. 307-08,
319). The district court agreed with the parties that the Leasehold Mortgage
was unambiguous and could be interpreted as a matter of law. (R. 310, "the
court now finds and concludes, based on the face of the document, that it was
not ambiguous."; 314, "[t]he court thus determines that the document is not
ambiguous on its face. .. ."). The district court recited Utah law regarding
contract interpretation and decided accordingly. (R. 308, "[t]he court
interprets this contract in accord with Utah law"; 309-314). Wolfs
accusations to the contrary are not supported by the record.
POINT II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE

The district court did not, as Wolf contends, err in excluding extrinsic
evidence. No party has alleged the agreements at issue here are ambiguous,
and the district court held they are not ambiguous based upon a facial

review. Therefore, it would have been error for the district court to rely upon
extrinsic evidence.
The district court accurately described and applied Utah law regarding
the role of extrinsic evidence in construing contracts. "The court must first
make a legal determination whether there is a facial ambiguity before
turning to extrinsic evidence." (R. 309) (citing Dairies, 2008 UT 51; Ward v.
Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P2d. 264 (1995)). So long as the language
within the four corners is unambiguous, courts "look no further than the
plain meaning of the contractual language." Mid-American Pipeline Co. v.
Four-Four Inc., 2009 UT 43, 1 19, 216 P.3d 352; see also Daines, 2008 UT 51,
1 37, ("[W]e do not need to resort to the admission of parol evidence on the
question of intent, because absent a finding of facial ambiguity, 'the parties'
intentions must be determined solely from the language of the contract."')
Although trial courts have some discretion in determining whether an
ambiguity exists,
[T]he proffered alternate interpretation must be plausible
and reasonable in light of the language used . . . . [T]o merit
consideration as an interpretation that creates an
ambiguity, the alternative rendition must be based upon
the usual and natural meaning of the language used and
may not be the result of a forced or strained construction. .
. . At minimum one universal standard applies to this
determination: words and phrases do not qualify as
ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow them
with a different interpretation according to his or her own
interests. . . .

Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20, Tf 17 (internal citations omitted).
The parties and district court are in agreement that the Leasehold
Mortgage is unambiguous. Nevertheless, Wolf urges that the district court
should have considered extrinsic evidence to determine the parties'
intentions. Such an approach is directly in contravention to Utah law.
Moreover, Wolfs claim that the trial court relied upon extrinsic
evidence proffered by ASCU, but not the evidence proffered by Wolf is
unsupported and untrue. The contract documents at issue are not extrinsic
evidence. The contract documents were the sole source of the district court's
interpretation. The district court painstakingly went out of his way to point
this out several times in his Ruling and Order. See e.g. Ruling and Order at
16, 17, 19, 20, and 21. In sum, because the both parties and the district court
agree that the leasehold mortgage is unambiguous on its face, the district
court properly refused to rely upon extrinsic evidence.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, ASCU respectfully requests that the Court
issue an Order (i) affirming the district court's March 26, 2010 order denying
Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C.'s motion for summary judgment and granting
ASC Utah, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment, and (ii) granting such other
and further relief as it deems just and proper.
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